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SchizophreniaThe experience of hearing a voice in the absence of an appropriate external stimulus, formally termed an auditory
verbal hallucination (AVH),may bemalingered for reasons such as personalﬁnancial gain, or, in criminal cases, to
attempt a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. An accurate knowledge of the phenomenology of AVHs is cen-
tral to assessing the veracity of claims to such experiences. We begin by demonstrating that some contemporary
criminal cases still employ inaccurate conceptions of the phenomenology of AVHs to assess defendants' claims.
The phenomenology of genuine, malingered, and atypical AVHs is then examined. We argue that, due to the
heterogeneity of AVHs, the use of typical properties of AVHs as a yardstick against which to evaluate the veracity
of a defendant's claims is likely to be less effective than the accumulation of instances of defendants endorsing
statements of atypical features of AVHs.We identify steps towards the development of a formal tool for this pur-
pose, and examine other conceptual issues pertinent to criminal cases arising from the phenomenology of AVHs.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Experiences of hearing voices in the absence of any appropriate
external stimulus, referred to in the psychiatric literature as auditory
verbal hallucinations (AVHs), are a common feature ofmany psychiatric
disorders. Although they aremost frequently found in people diagnosed
with schizophrenia, with approximately three in four people with this
diagnosis experiencing AVHs, they may also be found in people with
other psychiatric diagnoses including bipolar disorder, borderline per-
sonality disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder, as well as healthy
members of the general population (McCarthy-Jones, 2012).
Ever since the publication of one of psychology's most well-known
and controversial studies (Rosenhan, 1973a), it has been recognized
that trainedmental health professionals may be deceived by individuals
falsely claiming to be experiencing AVHs. Although there is little reason
to suspect that distressed individuals routinely presenting to mental
health services are falsely claiming to hear voices, there are a number
of situations where there may be a potential beneﬁt for individuals to
falsely claim to be experiencing AVHs. Such individuals are said to be
malingering, which the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) deﬁnes as “the inten-
tional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychologi-
cal symptoms,motivated by external incentives” (p. 739). These external
incentives may include attempting to evade military service, obtaining
unwarranted social welfare payments, or escaping prosecution eithernd its Disorders, Department of
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ghts reserved.through being found incompetent to stand trial, or not guilty by reason
of insanity at trial. This is true despite some studies suggesting that
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity serve a longer time with
loss of freedom than those who are found guilty of the crime (Perlin,
1990). The existence of defendants malingering AVHs in criminal cases
(e.g., People v. Schmidt, 1915) and persons malingering AVHs to gain
ﬁnancial advantage (e.g., Jaffe & Sharma, 1998) arewell documented. In-
deed, it has been claimed that AVHs are the most frequently malingered
symptom of psychosis by criminal defendants (Schmidt, 2009).
The reasons individuals choose to malinger AVHs speciﬁcally (as
opposed to other experiences associated with psychosis) may include
the perceived association between AVHs and insanity in the public eye
(e.g., Leudar, Thomas, McNally, & Glinski, 1997), and the effectiveness
of AVHs in potentially obtaining a successful insanity plea. In Knoll
and Resnick's (2008) three-stage conception of professional psychiatric
opinion formation for the applicability of an insanity defense, the
presence of AVHs can be seen to aid the formation of an opinion of in-
sanity at all three stages. Knoll and Resnick's conception can be applied
to the Model Penal Code insanity standard developed by the American
Law Institute in 1955. This states that “A person is not responsible for
his criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law” (Knoll & Resnick, 2007).
In line with this Code, Knoll and Resnick (2008) argued that opinion
must ﬁrstly establish if the defendant had a “mental disease or defect.”
A psychiatric diagnosis per se is not enough to meet this requirement.
The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) contains an explicit disclaimer that simply
having a diagnosis included in the manual does not imply that it meets
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Resnick, 2007). Given that AVHs are deﬁned as a characteristic symp-
tom of schizophrenia, and that the 1982 American Psychiatric Associa-
tion Position Statement on the Insanity Defense stated that for a
disorder to be a “mental disease or defect” it should “usually be of the
severity (if not always of the quality) of conditions that psychiatrists
diagnose as psychoses”, AVHs are likely to lead to the judgment that
the individual has a “mental disease or defect”.
Secondly, expert opinion must establish evidence of capacity. AVHs
may overwhelm an individual's ability to conform his/her conduct to
the requirements of the law. Similarly, in the case of a deiﬁc decree (in
which a person hears the voice of God instructing him/her to perform
an action), a criminal defendant could argue he/she did not know the
wrongfulness of his/her actions, and therefore qualify for insanity in
U.S. states that do not have an “inability to refrain” arm of the insanity
test. Yet only 16 states in the U.S. have an insanity standard that allows
for consideration of the capacity to conform one's conduct to the
requirements of the law (Knoll & Resnick, 2007). In deciding whether
a person could refuse to obey a command AVH, the evaluator must
assess the consequences an individual believes will follow as a result
of failing to obey the voice (Knoll & Resnick, 2007). The perceived con-
sequences for failing to obey a command hallucination may range from
restless sleep, to a signiﬁcant danger to the self, to a belief that one's soul
will spend eternity in Hell. Only consequences of the severity of these
latter types are likely to meet the insanity standard.
Finally, the defendant must establish that the AVH played a causal
role in the offense. Here it is critical for the psychiatric evaluator to es-
tablish the relationship between the AVH and the defendant's criminal
behavior (Knoll & Resnick, 2007). In summary, given that veridical
AVHs can, for the reasons outlined above, lead to a successful insanity
defense, malingered AVHs may lead to an unjust trial outcome.
In the U.S. about 1% of defendants charged with a felony plead in-
sanity, and only 15–25% of these individuals are actually found not guilty
by reason of insanity (Callahan, Steadman, McGreevy, & Robbins, 1991).
Of this subset of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity,
Thomson, Stuart, and Holden (1992) found that about 9% reported com-
mand AVHs (hearing voices commanding them to do things) that were
directly related to their offenses. Nevertheless, the potential for malin-
gered AVHs to be involved in such defenses, aswell as in other situations
in which personal gain is sought, creates the need for clinical experts to
be able to establish, as accurately as possible, whether a given individual
who reports hearing voices is reporting a veridical experience or is
malingering.
While the existence of malingered AVHs naturally focuses attention
on preventing miscarriages of justice resulting from malingered AVHs
going undetected, there is also the danger of injustice resulting from
someonewhohas genuinely experiencedAVHs being incorrectly labeled
a malingerer. This issue was raised by the second part of Rosenhan's
(1973b) classic study. Rosenhan contacted staff at a hospital to inform
them that at some time during the following 3 months, one or more
people faking AVHs would attempt to be admitted into the psychiatric
hospital. Of 193 judgments on patients made by the staff and obtained
by Rosenhan, 21% were alleged with high conﬁdence to be faking. It
was then revealed that, in fact, Rosenhan had sent no pseudopatients
at all to the hospital. It is hence quite plausible that, in a court of law,
some defendants who honestly report having had AVHs may be incor-
rectly deemed by expert testimony to be malingering.
The ability to accurately assess whether claimed AVHs are veridical
or malingered is hence of crucial importance, particularly for the out-
come of criminal trials in which the defendant is claiming such experi-
ences as being relevant to his/her defense or their competence to stand
trial. Clinicians called on to make this judgment must have a detailed
knowledge of the phenomenology of genuine AVHs. Such decisions
may also be proﬁtably informed by knowledge of the phenomenology
of malingered AVHs (Pollock, 1998). To address these important issues,
this paper explores a number of key areas surrounding the relationshipbetween the phenomenology of AVHs and the malingering of such
experiences. Firstly, we argue that an incorrect understanding of the
phenomenology of AVHs is still being employed in at least some con-
temporary criminal trials. This has the potential to lead to instances of
defendants being wrongly labeled as malingerers. In an attempt to re-
dress this situation, we will examine the phenomenology of genuine
AVHs as established by contemporary research. Yet we will show that,
although there are at least some phenomenological features of AVHs
that are found in the majority of cases, the heterogeneity of AVHs
means that an approach to assessing the veracity of an AVHbased solely
on comparing a claimed instance of an AVH against a proﬁle of a typical
AVH is likely to have signiﬁcant limitations. The phenomenology of
malingered AVHs will then be examined, and recommendations made
for more valid assessments of AVHs.
2. Inaccurate conceptions of the phenomenology of AVHs in
the courtroom
The court documents of a 2004 appeal (People v. Jefferson, 2004)
provide a good example of an incorrect conception of the phenome-
nology of AVHs being used to evaluate the veracity of a defendant's
claim to be hearing voices. In 1994, Senque Jefferson was incarcerated
in California as a result of being convicted of ﬁrst degree murder and
a series of armed robberies. On the morning of March 10th 2000,
as Jefferson was being escorted back from the exercise yard by two
prison ofﬁcers, he kicked one ofﬁcer in the stomach, and the other in
the leg. The appeal documents described how, after Jefferson was in
turn punched by one of the ofﬁcers in his shoulder and the back of his
head, he spat on both ofﬁcers. This led to him being convicted of two
counts of battery. Later that same year, on July 3rd 2000, Jefferson was
in the inﬁrmary of Sacramento jail. That day he was taken to a holding
cell in preparation for a meeting with a committee of mental health
professionals to review his placement in the inﬁrmary. The committee
decided it would not see him that day, and ordered him to be taken
back to his cell. As he was being taken out of the holding cell, Jefferson
kicked one of the prison ofﬁcers twice in the leg. This led to another con-
viction for battery. These incidents formed the third strike for Jefferson,
who under the “Three Strikes Law”was sentenced to 50 years to life in
prison.
How did Jefferson defend his actions? In relation to the incident in
March 2000, the court documents described that Jefferson argued in
his defense that: “As the ofﬁcers placed him in his cell, defendant
heard ‘voices’ outside his head. The voices told him the ofﬁcers would
hurt or kill him when he was in his cell, so he kicked the ofﬁcers
to get them off him.” In relation to the second incident in July 2000,
Jefferson argued that “the voices became loud while he waited in the
holding cell, telling him not to leave the cell because the ofﬁcers
would hurt him”. Jefferson described how “he heard voices ‘everyday,
all day’….The voices were usually those of women he knew when
he was out on the street. They told him such things as his food was
poisoned or a family member had died. At the time of trial he was on
medication – involuntarily – that he felt lowered the voices. Although
the voices were powerful, he was able to ignore them better.”
The ﬁrst part of Jefferson's trial involved establishing whether he
was sane or insane. It was here that Jefferson's allegation that he was
hearing voices came under scrutiny. One of the court-appointed psy-
chologists met with Jefferson and asked him to describe the voices he
heard in order to “determine whether defendant was faking a psycho-
logical problem”. Jefferson stated that his voices “were voices of ‘people
that he knew in the past’ and were ‘in his ear’”. The court-appointed
psychologist attempted to compare the location and content of the
voices Jefferson described against what she thought was the typical
phenomenology of AVHs. The court documents described how in the
court-appointed psychologist's experience, “schizophrenics typically
described voices ‘as coming from inside their head andbeingof either fa-
mous people or strangers or groups of people.’ She [the court-appointed
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literature does not support the court-appointed psychologist's descrip-
tion of the phenomenology of hearing voices in people diagnosed with
schizophrenia. In the following, we examine speciﬁc issues raised by
the psychologist in turn.
Claim 1. Voices are typically heard as coming from inside the head
(with the corollary that voices heard as coming from outside the head
are atypical).
The research evidence does not support the claim that internally-
located voices are emblematic of genuine AVH, and externally-located
voices are atypical (e.g., Junginger & Frame, 1985). For example, the
largest study on this question (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012) found that
of 199 psychiatric patients (81% who had been diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia), 38% heard both voices coming from inside and outside their
head, 34% only heard internally-located voices, and 28% only heard ex-
ternally located voices. The second largest study of this question
(Nayani & David, 1996), which studied 100 psychiatric patients (the
majority with a diagnosis of schizophrenia), found that 38% of patients
described having a voice which was located inside their head, whereas
“49% of the sample heard their voices through their ears as external
stimuli” (p. 180).
Claim 2. Voices are typically those of famous people or of groups of people
or those of strangers.
A signiﬁcant number of people diagnosedwith schizophrenia identi-
fy their voices as being thoseof famous people. For example, Leudar et al.
(1997) found that 6 of 13 people diagnosedwith schizophrenia said that
their voices were those of public ﬁgures. However, their ﬁndings also
imply that the majority of such voice-hearers did not say their voices
were of public ﬁgures. Of relevance to the claim that the voices heard
are typically those of strangers, Nayani and David (1996) found
that “Hallucinated voices were often known to the patient in real life,
indicating that they may be modeled on the memory of a real voice.”
(p. 181). Indeed, in their study 46% of patients heard voices which
could be identiﬁed as likely being real, known people, such as a relative,
neighbor, or doctor. Similarly, Garrett and Silva (2003) found that 46%
of patients (the majority of whom had a diagnosis of schizophrenia)
“believed they recognized at least one of their voices as a speciﬁc friend,
family member, or acquaintance”. Furthermore, McCarthy-Jones et al.
(2012) found that 70% of patients reported that the voices they head
were like those of people who had spoken to them in the past. The
wider AVH literature is also replete with examples of people hearing
voices of people they personally know and have actually encountered
in the past (e.g., Romme, Escher, Dillon, Corstens, &Morris, 2009). Final-
ly, in terms of hearing the voices of groups of people, McCarthy-Jones
et al. (2012) found that 53% of patients had never heard all their voices
speak at the same time (like a chorus) and, although Nayani and David
found 57% of patients described hearing the sounds of crowds of people
mumbling or talking together, this was in addition to the individualized
voices they heard.
It hence appears the court-appointed psychologist's description
of the phenomenology of AVHs was ﬂawed in light of the available
scientiﬁc evidence, most of which had been published prior to the trial
(e.g., Nayani & David, 1996). We are not offering an opinion as to
whether or not the defendant was actually hearing voices. This cannot
be determined from a review of court documents.1 Rather, we simply
note that the stated phenomenology of AVHs used in the courtroom1 Although other aspects of Jefferson's alleged experiences with AVHs described in the
trial transcripts may be informative in aiding such a decision. For example his report that
medication helped him not by ridding him of the voices but allowing him to “ignore them
better” is consistent with many genuine patients' reports of how medication helped then
(e.g., Elkes & Elkes, 1954).was inaccurate, and that the existence of such a mischaracterization of
the phenomenology of AVHs creates the possibility that instances of
genuine AVHs may be incorrectly judged as malingered, or vice versa.
One potential remedy to this situation is formental health professionals
to develop a more accurate understanding of the phenomenology of
typical AVHs.
3. The phenomenology of genuine and malingered AVHs
3.1. Typical properties of AVHs
The phenomenology of genuine AVHs has previously been docu-
mented in a) reviews of the AVH research literature (McCarthy-Jones,
2012), b) speciﬁc individual empirical studies (Garrett & Silva, 2003;
Hoffman, Varanko, Gilmore, & Mishara, 2008; Leudar et al., 1997;
McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Moritz & Larøi, 2008; Nayani & David,
1996), and c) in reviews that have aimed to summarize the phenome-
nology of AVHs with a speciﬁc view to aiding the detection of malin-
gered voices (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). However, a limitation of previous
reviews is that they have only been able to draw on one study of the
phenomenology of AVHs with a large sample size, that of Nayani and
David (1996) which examined AVHs in 100 psychiatric patients. All
other studies have employed a signiﬁcantly smaller sample size. This
raises questions about the reliability of the ﬁndings of previous reviews.
The potential for overdependence on Nayani and David's (1996)
ﬁndings recently motivated a new empirical study by McCarthy-Jones
et al. (2012) on the phenomenology of AVHs, employing the largest sam-
ple of psychiatric patients to-date (N = 199; 81% with schizophrenia).
This study reported a number of new ﬁndings, highlighting that
patients may hear a greater number of voices than had been previously
thought, showed that voices speaking at a normal conversational
volume was less common than had been previously thought, and that
12% of patients reported hearing voices that they felt were identical
“replays” of memories of previous conversations they had experienced
(an experience more often associated with posttraumatic stress disor-
der than psychosis). By adding these ﬁndings to the corpus of existing
research in this area, the proﬁle of the phenomenology of a ‘typical
AVH’may be improved,which can beused as a better yardstick to assess
the validity of claimed AVHs.
Table 1 presents a summary of a number of phenomenological prop-
erties found in themajority of AVHs. From this, a portrait of typical AVHs
can be developed. The typical voice-hearer will hear more than one
voice. The voices will be different from the voice-hearers own voice,
and will sound much like hearing other people speak. The voice-
hearerwill usually be able to identifywho are at least some of the voices
(e.g., identifying some of them as real, known people, or attribute the
voice to a supernatural entity such as God or the Devil). The voices
will typically be heard several times a day or most of the time, with
the length of each instance being highly variable (lasting from just
seconds to continuing for over anhour). The voiceswill attempt to inﬂu-
ence the voice-hearer's activity by issuing commands {“Command:
voices”} to perform speciﬁc actions, and may also judge the voice-
hearer, typically negatively, through critical or abusive comments
directed at him/her. In addition to these negative voices, positive voices
will very often be reported, which are kind, loving and supportive.
Voices will tend to be very repetitive in what they say. The voice-
hearer will have some control over his/her voices, and some will be
able to ask questions of the voices and get answers back. Individual
voices will also typically be accompanied by background mumbling
voices. In addition to this, voice-hearers will generally be able to clearly
recall the ﬁrst time they heard the voice (Romme & Escher, 1993),
and will report other forms of hallucinations as well, such as music,
clicks and bangs, visual hallucinations and/or tactile hallucinations
(Nayani & David, 1996). Furthermore, they will have developed a
range of strategies to cope with their voices (Farhall, Greenwood, &
Jackson, 2007), will report that their voices become more frequent
Table 1
Typical phenomenological properties of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) and voice-hearers' relations with them.
Property of AVH Majority of voices Exceptions
Acoustics Are like hearing other people speak
(Garrett & Silva, 2003; Leudar et al., 1997)
44% of patients found to report that their AVHs were more like ideas
than external sensations
(Nayani & David, 1996)
Absolutely silent AVHs reported by 5% of patients
(Moritz & Larøi, 2008)
{“Moritz, S.”}
Clarity Speak clearly
(Garrett & Silva, 2003; Leudar et al., 1997)
Mumbling voices are commonly heard, but it is rare for patients to
only hear mumbling voices
(Nayani & David, 1996)
21% of patients hear some voices that speak gibberish, i.e., don't make sense
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012)
Reality Are experienced as very real (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012) 11% of patients report voices which are ‘dream-like’ or only ‘somewhat real’
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012)
Number More than one voice is heard
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
18% of patients report hearing only one voice
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012)
Location Are either externally-located, internally located, or both
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
AVHs may be experienced as coming from other parts of the body, e.g., the stomach
(Nayani & David, 1996)
Accent Differ from the voice-hearer's own voice
(Hoffman et al., 2008; Nayani & David, 1996)
McCarthy-Jones et al. (2012) found 34% of voice-hearers said it was possible that
itwas actually their own voice and thoughts they heard, and 74% never heard voices
with accents
Identity Sound like someone the patient knows
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
Conversely, a signiﬁcant minority do not know identity of voice
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
Frequency and
length
Occur several times, ormost of the time, each day.Most commonly they
will last for hours, but often will speak for seconds or minutes only
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
Some patients experience continuous AVHs
(Hoffman et al., 2008)
Many have AVHs that are constantly with them
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012)
Content Attempt to regulate voice-hearer's activity by issuing commands
{“Command:voices”} or telling them to perform speciﬁc actions,
and/or judge them, being typically critical or abusive
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
Around 40–50% of voice-hearers have positive, benevolent AVHs
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996)
Repetitive Are repetitive in terms of which voice is predominant and what it says
(Hoffman et al., 2008; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012)
A signiﬁcant number of AVHs have novel content each time
(Hoffman et al., 2008; Nayani & David, 1996)
Relation with AVH Majority of voice-hearers Exceptions
Speaking to voices Can talk {“Talking with voices”} interactively with their voices,
asking questions of them and getting answers back
(Garrett & Silva, 2003; Leudar et al., 1997)
Conversely, many cannot
(Garrett & Silva, 2003; Leudar et al., 1997; Nayani & David, 1996)
Control Exercise at least some control over their voices at some times
(Moritz & Larøi, 2008; Nayani & David, 1996)
Conversely, 11% of patients have been found to say they have no control at all
(Moritz & Larøi, 2008)
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pact the frequency of their voices (Nayani & David, 1996).
Despite this ability to describe typical AVHs, these are highly hetero-
geneous experiences, as has been observed before in the research
literature (Jones, 2010; Larøi, 2006;McCarthy-Jones, 2012) and this het-
erogeneity is reﬂected in Table 1. Previously, due to the heterogeneity in
the perceived location of AVHs, Resnick and Knoll (2008) had suggested
that the “location of hallucinations should not be used to determine
their genuineness” (p. 55). We are able to now go further than this to
propose that none of the properties listed in Table 1 should be used
alone to determine the genuineness of AVHs, due to the heterogeneity
of the experience. Thus the creation of a proﬁle of a typical AVH has sig-
niﬁcant limitations for use as the sole yardstick to assess the validity of a
claimed AVH. Instead, further approaches are needed.
3.2. Atypical properties of AVHs
Another approach is to examine if an individual who is claiming to
hear voices is reporting a signiﬁcant number of properties atypical of
AVHs. The technique of asking about the presence of atypical features
of an experience as a method to assess malingering has previously
been successfully employed in relation to themalingering of psychiatric
symptoms (e.g., Rogers, Kropp, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992).
Resnick and Knoll (2008) previously noted a number of properties of
atypical AVHs, which included being continuous, vague/inaudible, not
associated with delusions, using stilted language, being non-context
dependent, being unbearably distressing, and the voice-hearer having
no strategies to diminish malevolent voices, obeying all commands,and not showing behavioral evidence of being distracted. However,
McCarthy-Jones et al. (2012) found that 48% of voice-hearers said
their voices were “constantly with them”, even if they were not talking
continuously. There is also some evidence that many voice-hearers may
hear voices in the absence of delusional ideation (Sommer et al., 2010)
and it is possible that the clinically observed relation betweenAVHs and
delusions may be due to “Berkson's” selection bias (Bentall, 2009); the
tendency for hospitalized patients to be suffering from more than one
troubling experience, rather than there being any causal link between
the two.
One could add to Resnick and Knoll's (2008) amended list the items
found by McCarthy-Jones et al. (2012) to occur in less than 5% of
patients with AVHs, namely having a voice whose normal speaking
tone is screaming or yelling, hearing only female voices, hearing only
children's voices, never hearing the same voice twice, and never hearing
voices with the same theme or content. These items are combined with
the items from Table 1 noted as being atypical, as well as other ﬁndings
from the research literature, to create a list of atypical properties
of AVHs, which are presented in Table 2. Some of the characteristics
listed in Table 2, such as alleging that all command AVHs cannot
be resisted, have been explicitly used by experts as part of their consid-
erations that voice-hearers were malingering their AVHs in court cases
(e.g., U.S. v. Ramirez, 2007).
Although a small minority of voice-hearers may report atypical
facets of voices, such as those presented in Table 2, the presence of
many of these items would have a very low cumulative probability,
and would hence suggest an individual was malingering AVHs. Thus,
for example, although Hellerstein, Frosch, and Koenigsberg (1987)
Table 3
Differences between AVHs of genuine and faking voice-hearers (adapted from Pollock,
1998).
Characteristic of voice Percentage of
‘simulators’ claiming
this property
(N = 35)
Percentage of genuine
voice-hearers claiming
this property
(N = 30)
Frequency: continuous 43% 0%
Duration: N1 h 54% 13%
Number of voices: single 69% 20%
Number of voices: multiple 31% 80%
Gender of voice: ‘other’ 14% 67%
Age of voice: mixed 0% 40%
Accent: same 60% 40%
Accent: different 3% 37%
Volume: shouting 43% 17%
Length of utterance: long 9% 77%
Length of utterance: few words 60% 13%
Identity of voice: recognizable 14% 50%
Repetitiveness: very repetitive 51% 7%
Intelligible voice: rarely 60% 17%
Content: abusive 31% 13%
Source: external 11% 67%
Source: both internal and external 63% 7%
Command related to crime 83% 10%
Person never responds to voices 0% 67%
Control over voices: yes 0% 73%
Distress: unbearable 54% 0%
Informed others of voice: yes 49% 7%
Others can hear the voice: yes 6% 53%
Table 2
Properties of atypical auditory verbal hallucinations.a
Source Property
The voice-hearer
reports…
• all voices being vague, inaudible, or mumbling.
• not having any positive or benevolent voices.
• having no repetitive voices.
• hearing voices coming from inside parts of their body
other than their head.
• having hallucinations only in the auditory verbal modality
(i.e., not having any non-verbal auditory hallucinations,
e.g., music, clicks or bangs, or visual or tactile hallucinations).
• not having any coping strategies for dealing with malevolent
voices.
• not at least sometimes having any control over the voices.
• having voices that are not affected by context (e.g., mood,
place or circumstances).
• the voices are unbearably distressing.
• obeying all commands of the voice.
• voices changing gender mid-sentence.
• voices sounding mechanical or robotic, or being the voices of
animals.
• voices neither criticizing nor abusing them, and not making
comments related to on-going activities.
• being alone does not increase the frequency of the voices.
• not being able to recall the ﬁrst time they heard their voice.
• the voice's normal speaking tone is shouting or yelling.
• hearing only female or only children's voices.
• never hearing the same voice twice.
• never hearing voices with the same theme or content.
(Farhall et al., 2007; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Moritz & Larøi,
2008; Nayani & David, 1996; Romme & Escher, 1993; Stephane
et al., 2006)
An external
observer sees…
• no behavioral evidence of distraction.
a It is important to reiterate that although each property listed here is atypical, some
people will indeed hear voices with such properties.
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cases, making such voices atypical of AVHs according to present criteria,
this does not mean that someone who claims that they had such AVHs
demonstrate prima facie evidence of malingering. Instead, it is neces-
sary for individuals to allege a number of rare properties of AVHs in ad-
dition to hearing homicidal commands, before a valid judgment on their
veracity can be made.
Such an approach is taken in the reliability subscale of Stephane,
Pellizzer, Roberts, and McCalannahan's (2006) Computerized Binary
Scale of Auditory SpeechHallucinations (cbSASH). The 168 item cbSASH
includes 30 items that are atypical of genuine AVHs, which constitute
the reliability subscale. Items on this 30-item reliability subscale include
statements on atypical content (e.g., “The voices order me to sleep”, “I
hear the voices of animals”, “The voices speak different languages that
I can't understand”, “The voices sound mechanical or robotic”), atypical
triggers (“I hear voices more when I feel bloated”, “Certain foods make
me hear voices”, “I hear voices whenever I open the window”), atypical
form (“The voices refer to me as ‘Mr…’ or ‘Mrs…’”, “The wind seems to
blow the voices into my head”), and atypical coping strategies (e.g., “I
drink milk to stop or decrease the voices”). Participants score 1 for
each of these 30-items that they respond to in the afﬁrmative. If their re-
sultant score is greater than 7, then they are deemed to bemalingering.
This (unpublished) cut-off point is derived from the cut off-score on the
Fp infrequency subscale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality In-
ventory (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer,
1989), through a correlation analysis between the Fp subscale and
the cbSASH reliability subscale (Massoud Stephane, personal communi-
cation). Stephane et al. (2006) found, in a sample of patients with
schizophrenia, that none of the items on this subscale were endorsed
by more than 40% of patients. Furthermore, cbSASH scores correlated
with the infrequency scales (Fb and Fp) aswell as the variable responseinconsistency (VRIN) subscales of the MMPI, adding evidence of the
scale's validity.
However, no work has been done to test the ability of this scale to
detect individuals who are actually malingering AVHs, and it has not
yet been used in a legal setting. Furthermore, this scale does not include
items based on many of the atypical properties of AVHs identiﬁed here
(Table 2). The inclusion of such items would likely lead to the develop-
ment of a more sensitive tool. The development and psychometric
validation of a new formal malingering AVH assessment tool would
thus be a fruitful task for future research. Such an instrument may also
be informed bywhatwe knowabout the phenomenology ofmalingered
AVHs, which we turn to next.
3.3. Feigned AVHs
Although it has been suggested by Resnick and Knoll (2008) that de-
tailed knowledge about genuine AVHs is the clinician's greatest asset in
recognizing simulated hallucinations, it has also been proposed that
knowledge about theproperties of feignedAVHsmay also be informative
(Pollock, 1998). If an individual attempts tomalinger voices, what sort of
AVHs are they likely to fabricate? By establishing this malingered phe-
nomenology, and then comparing itwith the phenomenology of genuine
AVHs, wemay be able to identify key points of differencewhich could be
useful for the detection of malingered AVHs. This is precisely what a
study by Pollock (1998) attempted to do. Pollock compared 30 offenders
in a medium-secure prison who were considered to have genuine AVHs
in the context of a diagnosed psychotic disorder (the majority of whom
had a diagnosis of schizophrenia) with 30 offenders with no psychotic
disorder who were asked to simulate having AVHs. Participants were
then asked 40 open-ended questions about their voices, based on the
items used in Nayani and David's (1996) phenomenological survey of
AVHs. In addition there were questions on other experiences associated
with psychosis and on the reality of the voices, which they responded
to using Likert scales. Key differences found by Pollock between the
responses of the genuine voice-hearers, and the answers given by
offenders who were attempting to fake voices are presented in Table 3.
Pollock (1998) concluded that individuals who were asked to fake
voices typically reported a “single continuous voice of the same accent,
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little variability” (p. 320). Those faking the experience also stated their
voices were unintelligible and unpredictable, and were less able to
give a possible identity for the voice when compared with genuine
voice-hearers. The choice to give their fake voices such characteristics
is logical, argued Pollock, as “it is easier to provide a consistent and
believable account of a single and simple hallucination which must be
recognized as debilitating.” (p. 322). Genuine voice-hearers were also
more likely to rate their voices as being ‘real’ as compared to fakers. It
was also noted that fakers did not endorse any additional hallucinatory
experiences (0% for all categories), whereas the genuine voice-hearers
reported that they also experienced visual (60%), gustatory (43%),
olfactory (43%), and tactile (26%) hallucinations. Pollock concluded
that “The ﬁndings here suggest that the malingering offender's choice
to masquerade as mentally ill relies on strategies of avoiding detection
by keeping the formof thepresenting symptoms simplistic and ensuring
sympathy and help by emphasizing exaggerated distress” (p. 323).
The accuracy of Pollock's (1998) study could be limited by the small
number of genuine voice-hearers (N = 30) employed, whichmay have
led to unreliable prevalence ﬁgures for this group. We hence compared
Pollock's endorsement rates for items in Table 3 to the recentﬁndings of
McCarthy-Jones et al. (2012), for variables included in both studies. This
comparison ﬁrstly suggested that Pollock had underestimated the re-
petitiveness of voices. Pollock reported (Table 1) that only 7% of genuine
voice-hearers had very repetitive voices, compared to 51% in the faking
sample. However, McCarthy-Jones et al. found that 72% of voice-hearers
had voices that were repetitive (in terms of their content/theme). Thus,
although those malingering may claim to hear repetitive voices, this is
coincidentally likemany genuine AVHs. A second limitation of Pollock's
study is that while only 13% of genuine voice-hearer's said that their
voices spoke for hours (compared to 54% of fakers), McCarthy-Jones
et al. (2012) found 59% of genuine voice-hearers said their voices
spoke for hours. Thirdly, although Pollock (1998) found only 7% of
genuine voice-hearers heard both external and internally located voices
(compared to 63% of fakers), McCarthy-Jones et al. (2012) found 38%
of voice-hearers heard both externally and internally located voices.
A further limitation of the Pollock study was that the malingered
AVHs were reported by people with no previous genuine experience
of AVH. If a person had previously experienced genuine AVHs, but
malingered them at the time of a crime, they would likely be able to re-
port AVHs with a phenomenology identical to genuine AVHs.
3.4. Concluding on the phenomenology of genuine and malingered AVHs
Due to the variability in the phenomenology of AVHs, the voices ex-
perienced by some genuine voice-hearers may still echo the typical
faked AVH. Therefore, the approach of examining the cumulative num-
ber of atypical properties of anAVH reported by an individual appears to
be the preferable way to attempt differentiation between genuine and
malingered AVHs. That being said, although the task is not beyond the
ken of expert clinicians, any clinician needs to tread carefully in any
such analysis, given the paucity of nomothetic or population-relevant
data in the area and their precise application idiographically to indi-
vidual cases with sufﬁcient sensitivity and speciﬁcity, as well as the
high bar set in criminal cases for burden of proof. The ﬁeld is in need
of further research on thematter, aswell as development of psychomet-
ric tests, which is addressed in the next section.
4. Future directions relating to the phenomenology of voices and
their malingering
The ability to correctly distinguish between genuine andmalingered
claims of AVHs is an advanced clinical skill, which requires training and
clinical experience. However, there are currently no psychometrically
validated, formal assessment tools, which are comprehensively based
on the phenomenology of AVHs, available to aid this task. As we havehighlighted in this paper, this may lead clinicians' assessments about
whether an individual's AVHs aremalingered to be based on an idiosyn-
cratic, non-evidence based conception of the phenomenology of AVHs.
To remedy this situation, we described the phenomenology of a typical
AVH. Yet we cautioned against reliance on this characterization of a
phenomenologically ‘typical’ AVH as a sole yardstick to assess potential
cases of malingered AVHs. This caution is urged due to the number of
voice-hearers whowill validly report voices that differ from the ‘typical’
AVH. AVHs are a highly heterogeneous experience. Instead, we argued
that a more valid approach would involve additionally assessing how
many atypical properties of AVHs a defendant endorses. Then a judg-
ment can bemade on the probability of them displaying the cumulative
number of such characteristics they report.
In order to create a formal assessment tool for detecting malingered
AVHs based on this premise, further development and psychometric
evaluation of tools, such as Stephane et al.'s (2006) reliability scale,
will be useful. They should employ some additional atypical items on
the phenomenology of AVHs highlighted in Table 2 here. Such a tool,
once developed, should of course supplement, rather than replace,
other relevant investigative techniques, such as assessing the consis-
tency of the history of reporting psychotic experiences, as well as
employing other general tests for malingering, such as the MMPI-2
(Butcher et al., 1989) and the Structured Interview of Reported Symp-
toms (SIRS-2: Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010).
In this paper we have focused on the phenomenology of AVHs asso-
ciated with psychosis, generally, and schizophrenia, speciﬁcally. How-
ever, AVHs are also found in a range of other psychiatric conditions.
This raises the question as to whether the phenomenology of AVHs in
these conditions differs signiﬁcantly from those found in schizophrenia.
Transdiagnostic research into voice-hearing is somewhat limited (Larøi
et al., 2012). However, the small number of existing studies in this
area suggests that AVHs are broadly phenomenologically similar across
diagnostic classes. For example, Kingdon et al. (2010) found AVHs in in-
dividuals diagnosedwith borderline personality disorder not to differ (if
a Bonferroni correction is applied for the number of analysis of variance
tests they performed) in their frequency, location, duration, loudness,
amount of negative content, distress, disruption or controllability,
from AVHs in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. Similarly, reports
of AVHs in veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder are highly simi-
lar to the voices heard in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia
(Anketell et al., 2010; Mueser & Butler, 1987). However, signiﬁcantly
more research remains to be done into the potential for transdiagnostic
differences in the phenomenology of AVHs. Thus, some caution may be
needed in creating an assessment tool that can be used to detect malin-
gered AVHs transdiagnostically.
Another pertinent topic that has recently drawn the attention of
mental health researchers, and is likely to prove of relevance to the
law, is the lack of a necessary connection between AVHs and psychopa-
thology. In the Jefferson case discussed above (People & Jefferson,
2004), it was notable that the prosecution argued that “you can't get
further apart from a reasonable person [than someone hearing voices]”.
Although this was part of a technical debate on the Reasonable Person
standard, it highlights the ingrained perception of an association
betweenAVHs andmental disease. However, a signiﬁcant number of in-
dividuals, termed “healthy voice-hearers” by Moritz and Larøi (2008,
p. 104), have been found to hear voices comparable in frequency, form
and content to those of psychiatric patients, but in the absence of social
or occupational impairment (Sommer et al., 2010). Such individuals can
also be found through history, dating back to Socrates' experience of
AVHs (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). The voices heard by healthy voice-
hearers have been found to be underpinned by the same neural activity
as those in psychiatric patients (Diederen et al., 2012). However, differ-
ences do exist at a phenomenological level, with healthy voice-hearers'
AVHs being distinguished by having less negative content, and the
voice-hearer having a greater degree of control over them (Beavan
& Read, 2010). The existence of such individuals is consistent with the
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Jones, 2012). This raises a number of potential issues for the legal sys-
tem. Firstly, it holds out the possibility that an individual may have
AVHs, not suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder, yet their AVHs
may still have played a role in their crime. Secondly, the lack of delu-
sional ideation in this group of voice-hearers means that the often
cited criteria for establishing whether a voice-hearing experience is
veridical, namely co-morbid delusions, is not necessarily valid. As
such, an awareness of the existence of healthy voice-hearers may
prove important for both law makers and clinicians. A precedent legal
case involving such a self- or other-identiﬁed healthy voice-hearer,
and the speciﬁc issues this raises, has yet to occur.
5. Conclusion
In summary, this paper has identiﬁed both the typical and atypical
phenomenological properties of AVHs, and reviewed what is known
about the phenomenology of malingered AVHs. More work is now re-
quired, drawing on these ﬁndings, to establish a reliable and valid psy-
chometric tool that can be used to assess the validity of an individual's
claims to have had experienced AVHs. Such a tool has the potential to
reduce miscarriages of justice that occur through malingered AVHs
going undetected, and through genuine AVHs being wrongly labeled
as malingered. Justice may be blind, but it should not be deaf to the
voices of voice-hearers.
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